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We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with
other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley’s (1967) equity test, i.e., the
requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her con-
sumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish
the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences
that accommodates prominent other-regarding preferences. Our results are rele-
vant for equitable allocation among inequity-averse agents and in a domain with
linear externalities that we introduce. Finally, we present conditions guaranteeing
that these allocations are efficient.
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1. Introduction
The need to equitably and efficiently allocate commonly and symmetrically owned re-
sources arises naturally in a market economy. Many economic activities that require
agents’ cooperation result in the division of assets, gains, losses, etc. Due to diversity of
preferences, it is not trivial to determine what an equitable distribution is. Foley (1967)
advanced in this endeavor and developed the following equity test: “Ask each person to
imagine changing places with every other [. . . ]. If no one is willing to change, the alloca-
tion is equitable.”1 An extensive literature has investigated the existence of allocations
satisfying this property and its compatibility with efficiency (see Thomson 2010, for a
survey). A common feature of these studies is that each agent’s welfare is assumed to be
independent of the consumption of the other agents. Under this assumption, Foley’s test
is referred to as the no-envy test, and can be simplified as the requirement that no agent
prefers the consumption of any other agent to her own consumption (Varian 1974). As-
suming externalities away entails a significant loss of generality. A growing literature in
experimental economics has consistently documented human behavior that cannot be
rationalized by self-regarding preferences, but can be rationalized by other-regarding
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preferences (see Fehr and Schmidt 2001, for a survey). This experimental evidence val-
idates our everyday observation of altruism, philanthropy, conspicuous consumption,
and the unavoidable partially public nature of consumption. We address this issue and
include other-regarding preferences in the study of equitable allocation of indivisible
goods and money. First, we argue that Foley’s equity test is suitable and meaningful in
our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a
general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other-regarding prefer-
ences. Our results are relevant for equitable allocation among inequity-averse agents
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and in a domain with linear externalities that we introduce.
Finally, we present conditions guaranteeing these allocations are efficient.
We focus on assignment problems with money. That is, there are n agents and n ob-
jects, each agent must receive one object, and individual consumption of money should
add up to a given budget. Examples are the assignment of tasks and salaries among em-
ployees, the allocation of a bequest with indivisible goods, and the allocation of rooms
and rent among roommates (Svensson 1983, Maskin 1987, Alkan et al. 1991). We depart
from the assumption—universal in previous literature—that each agent’s preferences
are defined on her consumption space. We consider, instead, agents who have pref-
erences on the set of possible allocations. Our basic assumptions on preferences are
continuity and anonymity of externalities, i.e., the welfare of each agent is not affected
by a permutation of the allotments among the other agents. Our results may not hold if
these assumptions are not satisfied (Section 3).2
Foley’s equity test is applicable in our environment. More importantly, the norma-
tive support that has been recognized for this test when applied to economies with self-
regarding preferences is preserved in economies with anonymous other-regarding pref-
erences. Essentially, it requires no interpersonal comparisons of utility, and implements
the principles of symmetry (Varian 1974) and equal opportunity (Kolm 1971). In Sec-
tion 2, we discuss these properties at length. Our analysis there gives us two further
insights. First, we discover other situations, beyond equitable allocation of commonly
owned resources, for which allocations passing Foley’s test are desirable, e.g., the alloca-
tion of tasks and salary among employees. Second, it gives us a basis to evaluate alterna-
tive extensions of the no-envy test to economies with other-regarding preferences. We
conclude that we should favor Foley’s original formulation. Here we also observe that in
our environment, the allocations passing Foley’s test coincide with those obtained by an
equal income market, which is an intuitively equitable institution (Varian 1976). Thus,
by studying the existence and welfare properties of these allocations, we are also study-
ing the existence and welfare properties of equal income market outcomes. We formal-
ize the connection between the two approaches in Section 5.1. To avoid confusion with
the multiple alternative equity tests that have been proposed in the literature, we refer
to the allocations passing Foley’s test as being noncontestable (on equity grounds).3
2Our model is motivated by other-regarding preferences exhibited by agents who face distributive sce-
narios with anonymous partners as in most laboratory experiments and charitable giving. In particular,
these agents do not have cardinal information about the welfare of the other agents. Thus, we concentrate
on consumption externalities.
3“Envy” and “inequity” are commonly understood as consumption externalities that can be captured in
our model. Referring to the allocations that pass our test as “fair,” “envy-free,” or “equitable” could mislead
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For simplicity of the presentation, we assume, for most of the paper, that consump-
tions of money are required to be nonnegative. This is also a realistic restriction in some
environments as the allocation of tasks and salary.4 Our basic existence result, Theo-
rem 1, states that if the preferences of at least n− 1 agents satisfy a requirement that we
refer to as the “compensation assumption,” noncontestable allocations exist. Obviously,
if the available budget cannot compensate the agents for not receiving one object or the
other, noncontestable allocations may not exist. This can happen for two reasons. First,
the agents do not care enough about their private consumption of money compared
to the object they receive. Second, even if agents care about money sufficiently, there
might not be enough money. These are exactly the situations that our compensation
assumption excludes.
We investigate the implications of our basic existence result for two domains of
other-regarding preferences of interest. First, we consider inequity-averse agents, i.e.,
agents who not only care about their own consumption, but also care about the equi-
tability of the profile of consumptions. Such an agent subjectively assesses equity of
an allocation. Her ideal is equality of consumption value. She loses welfare when, ce-
teris paribus, her perception of the value of the consumption of others deviates from the
value of her own consumption. Our domain is parametrized by the agent’s value func-
tions, a coefficient that captures the agent’s aversion to inequity against herself, and
a coefficient that captures aversion to inequity against others as in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). In our domain, an agent’s perception of the value of the allotment of others may
depend on her own allotment. In particular, this can accommodate an agent’s endow-
ment effect, i.e., her propensity to assign a different value to a bundle of goods when it
is assigned to her, compared to when it is assigned to others (Kahneman et al. 1990). It
turns out that when the endowment effect is bounded for inequity-averse agents and the
budget is large enough, there are noncontestable allocations (Theorem 2): this implies
that under a mild restriction on inequity aversion, the agents’ subjective assessment of
equity does not compromise the existence of allocations satisfying our objective equity
criterion. Second, we introduce a domain of preferences for which externalities are a lin-
ear function of the consumptions of money of the other agents. Here, noncontestable
allocations exist, for a sufficiently large budget, whenever externality coefficients are
uniformly bounded so that the direct effect of $1 allocated to an agent is greater than its
aggregate effect on the other agents (Theorem 4).
Besides symmetry and equal opportunity, another important dimension of distribu-
tive justice is economic efficiency (Moulin 2003). It turns out that noncontestability
may be incompatible with efficiency (Example 2 in the Appendix). For this incom-
patibility to hold, there must be an aggregate imbalance between private and social
the reader into thinking that these allocations minimize certain externality that the agents internalize in
their preferences. Additionally, referring to these allocations as “swap-proof” may suggest a strategic role
of all the agents involved in the swap. We adopt the more neutral terminology of “noncontestability,” which
suggests the application of an objective test of equity (see Kolm 1971, 1995, for a related discussion; see
Rawls 1971, for a discussion on why distributive justice is not the absence of envy, understood as the pain
at the well being of others).
4Section 5.2 extends our results to environments where consumptions of money can be negative.
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interests, however. Indeed, our results reveal that for a wide range of externalities, non-
contestable allocations are always efficient; thus, our results can be interpreted as first
welfare theorems for equal income competitive allocations. For inequity-averse agents,
noncontestable allocations are efficient for an open set of parameters that depend on
the bounds on the marginal value of money for the agents. This set grows monotoni-
cally and continuously when the bounds get closer for each agent. In the limit, where
the marginal value of money is constant and equal for all value functions for each agent,
there are no restrictions on aversion to inequity against the agent herself, and for large
n, there are few restrictions on the aversion to inequity against others (Theorem 3). Fi-
nally, the conditions under which we guarantee that noncontestable allocations exist
for linear externality preferences also guarantee that each noncontestable allocation is
efficient (Theorem 4).
Our existence results and welfare analysis provide a solid foundation for a theory
of equitable allocation of objects and money with other-regarding preferences. Here
it is also relevant to ask about the incentives issues associated with the implementa-
tion of noncontestable and efficient allocations (cf. Tadenuma and Thomson 1995);
about the manipulability of rules selecting these allocations (cf. Andersson et al. 2014);
about the refinement of this set based on further normative and practical requirements
(cf. Tadenuma and Thomson 1995); about the existence of systematic ways to select
noncontestable and efficient allocations that implement the notion of solidarity re-
quiring that when the budget increases, all agents are better off (cf. Alkan et al. 1991,
Velez 2015). These are all open questions, which are beyond the scope of this pa-
per and are only meaningful now that we have established general existence of non-
contestable and efficient allocations for a rich domain of admissible other-regarding
preferences.
Our existence results and welfare analysis generalize previous literature on existence
of envy-free allocations for assignment problems with no externalities (Svensson 1983,
Maskin 1987, Alkan et al. 1991). In particular, our inequity-averse domain contains the
domain of preferences with no externalities considered in these previous studies.5 At
a technical level, our results are related to the literature on land division (Dubins and
Spanier 1961). Part of our contribution is to show how the combinatorial approach to
land division introduced by Su (1999) is suitable to handle other-regarding preferences
in our model (Section 3).
Our work joins the efforts to solve the technical and conceptual challenges that arise
in economic models when one accounts for the possibility that agents may care about
the consumption of others, e.g., Gale (1984) for general equilibrium in a market with
indivisibilities and price externalities; Nogushi and Zame (2006) for general equilibrium
with a continuum of agents; Dufwenberg et al. (2011) for general equilibrium in classical
economies; Brânzei et al. (2013) for cake cutting procedures; and Azrieli and Shmaya
5The domain of profiles with no externalities for which we guarantee existence of noncontestable allo-
cations in Theorem 1 properly contains the domain in which Svensson (1983, 1987), Maskin (1987), and
Alkan et al. (1991) prove their existence results. First, we do not assume that an additional small amount of
money necessarily makes the agent better off. Moreover, in Theorems 1, 2, and 6, we are able to waive the
compensation assumption requirement for one agent.
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(2014) for the allocation of indivisible goods that can be shared by several agents. We
discuss in detail the relevant papers to us, i.e., Gale (1984), Dufwenberg et al. (2011), and
Azrieli and Shmaya (2014), in Sections 3 and 5.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model.
Section 3 presents and discusses our basic existence result. Section 4 presents our wel-
fare analysis and the application of our existence results in domains of other-regarding
preferences of interest. Section 5 discusses the relevance of our results for general equi-
librium theory and the extension of our results when one allows negative consump-
tion of money and a different number of agents and objects. The Appendix collects all
proofs.
2. Model
We consider the problem of allocating a social endowment of n objects A ≡ {αβ   }
and an amount M ∈R of an infinitely divisible good, which we refer to as money, among
a group of n agents N ≡ {12     n}. We assume that each agent should receive a bun-
dle of one object and an amount of money. Agent i’s generic consumption is (xiμi),
where xi ∈ R and μi ∈ A. An allocation is a pair z ≡ (xμ), where x ≡ (xi)i∈N ∈ Rn and
μ≡ (μi)i∈N ∈An, for which no two agents receive the same object, i.e., for i = j, μi = μj ;
z is feasible if
∑
i∈N xi = M .6 Alternatively, we write z ≡ (zi)i∈N , where zi ≡ (xiμi) is
agent i’s allotment at z. We denote the consumption of money of the agent who receives
object α at z by xα. We refer to xα as the consumption of money associated with object α
at z. We denote the set of allocations by Z, the set of feasible allocations by ZM , and the
set of feasible allocations at which each agent’s consumption of money is nonnegative
by Z+M . We endow Z with its natural box topology.
7 It will be convenient for our pur-
poses to reshuffle consumptions at a given allocation. That is, given z ≡ (zi)i∈N ∈Z and
permutation π :N →N , the allocation zπ is that at which agent i receives bundle zπ(i).
Agents have complete, transitive, and continuous preferences on Z.8 Given our
continuity assumption, we introduce, without loss of generality, preference representa-
tions. Each agent is endowed with a continuous utility function on Z. Agent i’s utility is
ui :Z → R and the utility profile is u≡ (ui)i∈N . We assume that externalities are anony-
mous, i.e., an agent’s welfare is not affected by reshuffling the consumption bundles of
the other agents. Formally, for i ∈ N and z ∈ Z, if π : N → N is a permutation such that
π(i) = i, then ui(z) = ui(zπ). We denote the set of utility functions by U and the set of
profiles by Un.
We investigate the existence and welfare properties of equitable allocations. Our
welfare analysis is standard. An allocation z ∈ZM is efficient for u if there is no other fea-
sible allocation that each agent weakly prefers to z and at least one agent strictly prefers
to z.
6We assume budget balance, a realistic assumption in some environments, which simplifies our presen-
tation. All of our results generalize if we assume free disposal of money, which may be relevant in some en-
vironments with negative externalities in which a Pareto improvement may be attained by burning money.
7A sequence of allocations {zk}k∈N converges as k→ ∞ to z ≡ (xiμi)i∈N if it converges component-wise,
i.e., for each i ∈N , xki → xi and there is some K ∈N such that for each k≥K, μki =μi .
8A preference is continuous if its weak upper and weak lower contour sets are closed in Z.
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Definition 1. The allocation z ∈Z is noncontestable on equity grounds for u (noncon-
testable for short) if no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consump-
tion with any other agent.
Our equity test was originally proposed by Foley (1967) and since Varian (1974) has
been specialized to environments without externalities. In this restricted environment
it has been a central equity criterion (Thomson 2010). In what follows, we argue that the
normative support that has been recognized for the test when there are no externalities
is preserved when there are anonymous externalities.
First, the test is simple and avoids controversial interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity. Second, it filters out the allocations that exhibit the clear-cut bias that one identifies
when an agent is better off when she exchanges her place with another agent (Varian
1974). Thus, it only rejects allocations that are unambiguously biased. Third, the alloca-
tions passing the test can be thought of as being the result of an equitable process that
gives equal opportunity to the agents (Kolm 1971). Indeed, for an allocation z, let B be
the set of bundles that are allotted to the agents at z. Imagine that one asks each agent to
select out of the set B her preferred consumption bundles given that the final consump-
tions in the economy will be those in B. This is a meaningful question for the agents in
our environment. With anonymous externalities, fixing the final consumptions in the
economy, the allocations that give an agent the same consumption bundle are welfare
equivalent. If z is noncontestable, each agent selects a set of bundles containing her
consumption at z. Thus, one can think of z as the outcome of a process in which each
agent is provided with the same opportunity set, B, from which she selects her preferred
choice.9
There are alternative extensions of the no-envy test to economies with externali-
ties (see Thomson 2010). The most relevant to us is a proposal by Kolm (1995) that re-
quires that no agent prefer the allocation at which all agents receive the consumption
of some other agent to the allocation at which all agents receive her own consumption,
i.e., z ≡ (z1     zn) is equitable if for each pair of agents i and j, (zi     zi)Ri (zj     zj).
In our model, this requires rankings of allocations outside the space in which pref-
erences are defined. Moreover, even if one extends preferences in an appropriate
way, the test does not implement equal opportunity. Thus, we favor Foley’s original
formulation.
An alternative approach to identify equitable allocations is to consider an intu-
itively equitable institution and the outcomes it produces. The most prominent such
institution is an equal income market. Varian (1976) argues in favor of these allo-
cations because they provide equal opportunity in a common set that is robust to
changes in tastes and population. In our environment, the set of equal income com-
petitive allocations and the set of noncontestable allocations coincide (see Section 5).
Thus, by studying the existence and welfare properties of noncontestable allocations,
we are also studying the existence and welfare properties of equal income competitive
allocations.
9We are abstracting from incentives issues, which can be analyzed only after allocations satisfying our
normative requirements are known to exist.
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Noncontestable allocations are desirable in environments beyond those with col-
lective and symmetric ownership. Consider, for instance, a manager who has to allocate
tasks and compensation among employees of the same rank. First, a noncontestable
allocation promotes harmony in the workplace, for no employee finds the allocation is
unambiguously biased toward another employee. Second, since they implement equal
opportunity, they allow the manager to document nondiscrimination in the workplace.
This reduces the likelihood of a law suit.
Even without externalities, it is evident that noncontestable allocations may not exist
if the budget is not enough to compensate agents for not receiving one object or the
other. For instance, suppose that at least two agents care only about the object they
receive and prefer the same object. No matter how the budget is distributed, at least
one of these agents will prefer to swap her consumption with the agent who receives
her preferred object. Thus, to guarantee existence of noncontestable allocations, one
has to assume that some agents care about money and that the budget is enough to
compensate them for not receiving one object or the other.
Definition 2. The utility function ui ∈ U satisfies the compensation assumption if for
each z ∈ Z+M at which agent i receives a bundle with zero money, she weakly prefers to
swap her consumption with some other agent who receives a positive consumption of
money.10
The compensation assumption is a statement about the budget in relation to the
agent’s preferences. It requires that if the agent receives no money at an allocation, no
matter how the budget is distributed among the other agents, she finds it attractive to
swap her allotment with at least one agent who receives some money. The assumption
also implicitly bounds the agent’s externalities. For other-regarding preferences the re-
quirement may not be satisfied for arbitrary large M even if the utility of the agent is
large when, ceteris paribus, her consumption of money is large. Thus, for it to be satis-
fied, it is also necessary that, ceteris paribus, the direct effect of a large consumption of
money by the agent dominates the externality on the other bundles (see our discussion
of linear preferences leading up to Theorem 4).
We say that there are noncontestable allocations for u ∈ Un when the budget is large
enough if the following property is satisfied: there is Mu such that if M ≥ Mu, there are
noncontestable allocations for u in Z+M .
3. Existence
Noncontestable allocations exist when agents care about money and there is enough
money to distribute.
Theorem 1. Let u ∈ Un. If the utility functions of at least n− 1 agents satisfy the compen-
sation assumption, there are noncontestable allocations for u in Z+M .
10Formally, for each z ∈ Z+M such that xi = 0, there is a permutation π that coincides with the identity
function except for agents {i j} and such that ui(zπ)≥ ui(z) and xπ(i) > 0.
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Theorem 1 proves possible our equity requirement in a model with a more realistic
description of the agents than the self-regarding preferences model. Since the result is
stated for an abstract domain, it is not immediate to realize what its implications are for
preference domains of interest. To do so, we show in Section 4 that our results apply
for inequity-averse preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and for a general domain with
linear externalities that we propose. We identify conditions on preferences in these do-
mains guaranteeing they satisfy the compensation assumption when the budget is large
enough.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on a combinatorial approach to equitable land divi-
sion introduced by Stromquist (1980) and Woodall (1980) and refined by Su (1999). Part
of our contribution is to show how these problems and our model with other-regarding
preferences are connected. Land division is concerned with the equitable allocation of a
measurable space among some agents whose preferences are represented by nonatomic
measures. The first results in this literature provided existence of allocations at which
each agent finds her assignment at least as good as that of the other agents (Dubins and
Spanier 1961). These results were unsatisfactory because assigned lots were unrestricted
measurable sets, leaving the possibility that an agent would receive a countable union
of small pieces of land. To solve this, the problem was redefined as the division of an
interval, say [01], into n subintervals among n agents. This provided an equitable di-
vision of any bounded set in a Euclidean space by means of n− 1 “cuts.” This problem
is equivalent to finding l in n−1, the standard simplex, at which each agent prefers a
different subinterval in {[0 l1] [l1 l1 + l2]     [l1 + · · · + ln−11]}. This is relevant for our
model with externalities. The utility of an agent from the kth interval in l ∈ n−1 depends
on l1     lk, for the location of the interval can only be determined when the length of
the previous intervals is known. Our proof, which is based on the direct application of
Sperner’s lemma introduced by Su (1999) to land division and chore allocation, reveals
that the simplicial subdivision methods developed to solve this problem are suitable to
handle anonymous consumption externalities in our model. Theorem 1, even when it is
restricted to externality-free economies, is not a consequence of the previous results in
this literature, however. In particular, it guarantees existence of noncontestable alloca-
tions for economies in which the preferences of one agent are not required to satisfy the
compensation assumption.11 Using the covering method developed by Woodall (1980),
one can prove our theorem under the additional assumption that each agent is indiffer-
ent to swap any two consumption bundles that have no money. This is very restrictive
in our environment. In a contemporary paper, Azrieli and Shmaya (2014) generalize the
simplicial covering methods in Stromquist (1980) and Woodall (1980) to accommodate
11Our theorem states that the requirement of the compensation assumption can be waived for one agent.
Intuitively, if the budget is not enough to compensate one agent for not receiving a certain object, that agent
can be allocated that object; as long as one can compensate all other agents, it is always possible to find a
noncontestable allocation (note that this does not say that one can construct a noncontestable allocation
without knowing the preferences of one agent). Our compensation assumption requirement cannot be
dropped for more than one agent. That is, for a given M and preferences of n− 2 agents, one can easily find
preferences for two additional agents such that the budget necessary for the existence of noncontestable
allocations is greater than M .
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problems where an object may be shared by several agents. Again, our results are inde-
pendent. Their covering methods require boundedness assumptions for all agents, so
our theorem is not a consequence of theirs.
If externalities are nonanonymous, the conclusion of Theorem 1 may not hold. The
issue is that nonanonymous externalities may limit the extent to which money can re-
duce the desire of an agent to swap her consumption with another agent.
Example 1 (Nonanonymous externalities). Let A ≡ {αβγ} and N ≡ {123}. Agent 3
cares only about money, i.e., u3(z)≡ x3. Preferences of the other agents are given by
u1(z)≡
{
x1 − 2 if μ2 = γ
x1 otherwise,
u2(z)≡
{
x2 + 1 if μ2 = γ
x2 otherwise.
These preferences are continuous and satisfy the compensation assumption when
M ≥ 2. Preferences of agents 2 and 3 are externality-free. In fact, they are quasi-linear.
Agent 1’s preferences are nonanonymous, for her welfare depends on the object received
by agent 2. There is no noncontestable allocation for this economy. To see this, suppose
that z ≡ (xμ) is noncontestable. Clearly, x3 ≥ max{x1x2}. Now, since agent 1 does
not prefer to swap her consumption with agent 3, x1 ≥ x3. Since x3 ≥ x1, we have that
x1 = x3 ≥ x2. Thus, μ2 = γ, for otherwise agent 2 would prefer to swap her consumption
with the agent who receives object γ. Consequently, x2 ≥ x1 − 1, for otherwise agent 2
would prefer to swap her consumption with agent 1. This implies that agent 1 prefers to
swap her consumption with agent 2. Thus, z cannot be noncontestable for u.12 ♦
4. Welfare analysis and economic domains
Noncontestability may be incompatible with efficiency. The issue here is that with
other-regarding preferences, the utility of each member of a group of agents can in-
crease by changing the profile of consumption of money among them, while their ag-
gregate consumption of money decreases. Thus, even in an economy in which ceteris
paribus each agent prefers more money and for which efficient allocations exist, each
noncontestable allocation may be Pareto dominated by extracting money from some
agents and giving it to the rest (Example 2 in the Appendix; see also our discussion lead-
ing up to Theorems 3 and 4).
This analysis suggests that the incompatibility of noncontestability and efficiency
is the result of an aggregate imbalance between private and social interests. In-
deed, when there are no externalities, noncontestable allocations of objects and
money are always efficient (Svensson 1983). Thus, one can expect that for a reason-
able range of externalities there is general compatibility of these two properties. We
show that this is so in two economic domains that capture natural other-regarding
preferences.
12Observe that our argument for nonexistence of noncontestable allocations is independent of budget
M and whether consumption of money is required to be nonnegative.
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4.1 Inequity aversion
An inequity-averse agent not only cares about her own consumption, but also about
the equitability of the profile of consumptions. The following preferences capture these
other-regarding preferences when each agent has equality of values as her own standard
of equity. For each z ≡ (xμ) ∈Z,
ui(z)≡ viμi(zi)−
ai
n− 1
∑
j∈N
max{viμi(zj)− viμi(zi)0} −
ci
n− 1
∑
j∈N
max{viμi(zi)− viμi(zj)0}
where ai and ci are nonnegative constants such that ci < 1 and ci ≤ ai, and for each i and
each α ∈ A, viα : R×A → R is a continuous, unbounded function that is strictly mono-
tone with respect to the first component and represents the value that agent i assigns to
the consumption bundles when receiving object α.13
This domain of preferences, which we denote by F , generalizes a proposal by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) for the allocation of money.14 Essentially, the agent takes her con-
sumption as a reference to evaluate deviations from equality. Her ideal would be equal-
ity of values. The agent loses some welfare when other agents receive different con-
sumption value than her. Ceteris paribus, she loses more welfare when the deviation is
against her than when the deviation is against others (ci ≤ ai). The requirement ci < 1
guarantees that, ceteris paribus, the agent prefers more money.
The value that an inequity-averse agent assigns to the consumption of another agent
may depend on the object she receives. This is realistic in environments in which receiv-
ing a certain object may give the agent a particular vantage point that affects her assess-
ment of others’ consumption. In particular, this can reflect the “endowment effect,” i.e.,
an agent’s propensity to assign a different value to a bundle of goods when it is assigned
to her compared to when it is assigned to others (Kahneman et al. 1990). It turns out that
when this effect has a limit, noncontestability is compatible with the agents’ subjective
assessment of equity. We say that the endowment effect is bounded for agent i if there is
K > 0 such that for each pair of objects α and β and each x ∈R, |viα(xα)−viβ(xα)| ≤K.
Theorem 2. Let u ∈ Fn and suppose the endowment effect is bounded for at least n− 1
agents. If the budget is large enough, there are noncontestable allocations for u.
The domain of quasi-linear inequity-averse preferences illustrates well the impli-
cations of Theorem 2. We say that an inequity-averse preference, ui ∈ F , is quasi-linear
when each viα has the form v
i
α(xββ)≡ νiα(β)+xβ; here, νiα(β) is the monetary value that
agent i assigns to receiving object β when she receives object α. Thus, the difference in
the value that agent i assigns to consumption bundle (xαα) when she receives objects
α and β is just the difference in the monetary value assigned to α in both situations,
i.e., να(α) − νβ(α). An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is that noncontestable
allocations exist when inequity-averse preferences are quasi-linear.
13Note that the functions viα are anonymous, i.e., do not depend on the identities of the other agents,
only on their consumption.
14Characterizations of Fehr–Schmidt preferences are discussed by Neilson (2006), Sandbu (2008), Rohde
(2010).
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Corollary 1. Let u ∈ Fn be quasi-linear. If the budget is large enough, there are non-
contestable allocations for u.
Noncontestable allocations for inequity-averse preferences may not be efficient
when the equity concerns of the agents overwhelm their private interests. For this to
be so, it must be the case that for some allocations it is possible to achieve a Pareto im-
provement by reassigning consumption of money without reshuffling objects. To see
this, let u ∈ Fn, z ≡ (xμ) be a noncontestable allocation for u, and z′ ∈ ZM . Let zπ be
the allocation obtained from z by permuting consumption bundles so each agent re-
ceives the object she receives at z′. Since z is noncontestable for u, no agent prefers zπ
to z. Thus, z′ can Pareto dominate z only if it Pareto dominates zπ .
There are essentially two worst-case scenarios in which an allocation can be Pareto
dominated for u ∈ Fn by reassigning money. Suppose that the consumption value of
each agent i = n is greater than her perceived consumption value for the consumption
of agent n. If each of the first n− 1 agents gives one unit of money to agent n, there can
be a Pareto improvement if for each of these agents the reduction in inequality of value
induced by the change offsets its direct effect. The following assumption precludes that
this is so.
Assumption F1. The utility function ui ∈ F is such that there are mi > mi such that
for each pair of objects α and β, the derivative of viβ(·α) is bounded below by mi and
bounded above bymi, and1516
ci
n− 1((n− 1)mi +mi) <mi
Now, suppose that the consumption value of each agent i = n is lower than her per-
ceived consumption value for the allotment of each agent j ∈ N \ {i n}, and is greater
than her perceived consumption value for the allotment of agent n. If each agent i = n
gives $1 to agent n, a Pareto improvement can be achieved not only because the in-
equality against agent n is reduced, but also because the inequality against agent i may
be reduced. There are three ways in which one can guarantee that this situation cannot
compromise efficiency of a noncontestable allocation. The first is to require that it does
not happen at all.
Assumption F2. The utility function ui ∈ F is such that there are bounds on the
marginal value of moneymi andmi as in Assumption F1 and
ci
n− 1((n− 1)mi +mi)+ (n− 2)
ai
n− 1(mi −mi) <mi
15A similar observation was made by Dufwenberg et al. (2011) for marginal effects of income in indirect
internal utility functions for inequity-averse agents in a general equilibrium setting.
16We are implicitly assuming that the functions viβ(·α) are differentiable. This is only for simplicity in
the presentation. The assumption can be replaced by the existence of mi and mi such that for each x ∈ R
and each δ > 0, mi ≤ (viβ(x+ δα)− viβ(xα))/δ≤mi .
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Second, it is enough to assume that there is no endowment effect. This implies
that no agent perceives inequity against herself at each noncontestable allocation. Let
z ≡ (xμ) be noncontestable for u, z′ ∈ Z, and let zπ be the allocation obtained from z
by permuting consumption bundles so that each agent receives the object she receives
at z′. Let i be the agent whose consumption of money is reduced the most from zπ to z′.
Suppose that agent i gains in utility by the reduction in inequity against her by reassign-
ing money from zπ to z′. If this is so and there is no endowment effect for agent i, she
must prefer z to zπ , for otherwise she would not perceive inequity against her at zπ . It
turns out that agent i’s loss from z to zπ is never compensated by the gain from zπ to z′.
Assumption F3. The utility function ui ∈F is such that for each pair of objects α and β,
viα(·α)= viβ(·α).
Finally, observe that Assumption F2 precludes worst-case scenarios that would not
arise if the agent’s marginal value of money of her own consumption is always greater
than that of her perceived marginal value of money for the consumption of the other
agents.
Assumption F4. The utility function ui ∈F is such that for each pair of different objects
α and β, the derivative of viα(·α) is bounded below and this bound is an upper bound of
the derivative of viα(·β).
Theorem 3. Let u ∈ Fn. Suppose that for each ui, one of the following items is satisfied:
(i) Assumptions F1 and F3; (ii) Assumption F2; (iii) Assumptions F1 and F4. Then each
noncontestable allocation for u, z ∈ZM , is efficient for u.
If our assumptions in Theorem 3 are not satisfied, the result may not hold. In the Ap-
pendix, we construct u ∈ Fn for which noncontestable inefficient allocations exist, and
such that each ui satisfies Assumption F1 and violates Assumptions F2–F4 (Example 3).
This example materializes the worst-case scenario described before Assumption F2.
Noncontestability and efficiency are compatible when inequity-averse preferences
satisfy the assumptions of Theorems 2 and 3. These theorems reveal that, provided the
lower bound on marginal value of money is positive for each agent, this always holds
for an open set of parameters ai and ci that depends on the bounds on the marginal
value of money. This set grows monotonically and continuously when the bounds get
closer. In the limit, where the marginal value of money is always constant and equal for
all value functions of each agent, there are no restrictions on ais and for large n, almost
all cis are acceptable, i.e., ci < (n−1)/n. Quasi-linear inequity-averse preferences are the
preferences that reach this maximal compatibility of noncontestability and efficiency.17
Corollary 2. Let u ∈ Fn be quasi-linear and such that for each i ∈ N , ci < (n − 1)/n.
Then each noncontestable allocation for u, z ∈ZM , is efficient for u.
17Quasi-linear preferences satisfy Assumptions F1, F2, and F4, and may violate Assumption F3.
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4.2 Linear externalities
We introduce a domain of preferences in which the welfare of an agent is a linear func-
tion of the consumption of the other. Consider two agents, say i and j, who receive ob-
jects α and β at some allocation, respectively. The key assumption here is that the effect
that agent j’s consumption of money, xj , has on agent i’s welfare is a constant propor-
tion of xj . We denote this proportion by ci(αβ): note that this proportion may depend
on the identity of the agent whose welfare is affected, the object that this agent receives,
and the object that the other agent receives, but not on her identity. In other words, this
proportion is independent of the identity of agent j. We assume quasi-linearity with
respect to the agent’s own consumption of money, i.e., for each z ≡ (xμ) ∈Z,
ui(z)≡ vi(μi)+ xi +
∑
j =i
ci(μiμj)xj
where ci(μiμj) ∈ [01) is the fraction of each dollar assigned to agent j at z that agent i
can use for her own benefit when she receives object μi and vi : A → R. We denote the
domain of these preferences by L.
Our linear externalities model is a natural representation when objects are inter-
connected. Think, for instance, of fields that have to be irrigated (money in our model
represents any infinitely divisible homogeneous good). Some proportion of water allo-
cated to field α will end up serving field β. This proportion may depend on the distance
between the fields and can be asymmetric, for one field may be higher than the other.
Our domain can even accommodate situations in which this proportion depends on
the agent who is assigned field α. This is a realistic assumption when agents may have
differential access to the technology that allows them to use the resources allocated to
others. This flexibility is also desirable in other environments. For instance, consider a
group of n senior partners in a consulting firm who are responsible for the completion of
a project; there are n tasks, each partner can assume responsibility for only one task, and
the firm has allocated a budget M to complete the project. Each partner will receive a
task and a share of the budget in order to assemble a team, buy equipment and software,
pay travel expenses, etc. Partners and their respective teams do not work in isolation, for
tasks are not completely independent. Software that team α purchases may also be of
use to team β. A travel intensive task may have less spillovers on the tasks that require
more computational power, however. Thus, how easy or difficult it is to guarantee the
completion of a task for a partner depends on her own competence and experience for
the task, her assigned budget, the budget assigned to each other task, and the ability of
the partner to use the possible spillovers from the other tasks.
The compensation assumption may not be satisfied for any budget M > 0 for some
linear externalities profiles. To illustrate this, assume that agent i’s valuations of all ob-
jects are equal and normalized to zero. Suppose further that when agent i receives ob-
ject α, the effect that the consumption of money of each other agent has on her welfare
is a proportion greater than or equal to 1/(n− 1). That is, ci(α ·) ≥ 1/(n− 1). Then her
utility when receiving object α and no money will be greater than or equal to M . If for
each β = α, ci(β ·)= 0, her utility from receiving an object different from α and a budget
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share less than the entire budget will be less than M . Thus, no matter how large M is,
there will be allocations at which she would not swap receiving α and no money for any
other bundle. Fortunately, when we rule out this example, we guarantee that not only
noncontestable allocations exist, but also they are efficient. We say that c > 0 strictly
bounds externality coefficients for agent i if for each pair α and β, ci(αβ) < c.
Theorem 4. Let u ∈ Ln. Suppose that 1/(n − 1) strictly bounds externality coefficients
for all agents. If the budget is large enough, there are noncontestable allocations for u.
Moreover, each noncontestable allocation for u, z ∈ZM , is efficient for u.
It is worth noting that 1/(n− 1) is the greatest uniform bound on externality coeffi-
cients guaranteeing that the direct effect of $1 allocated to an agent is greater than the
aggregate indirect effect on the other agents.
5. Discussion
5.1 Noncontestability and the market
An intuitive equitable institution is the market when each agent is given an equal share
of the aggregate income (here we cannot endow agents with equal parts of the aggre-
gate endowment, for some goods are indivisible). This institution operates as follows in
our environment. There is a vector of prices p ∈ RA, in terms of money, for the indivis-
ible goods. At these prices, the aggregate income in the economy is Ip ≡M +∑α∈Apα.
Each agent receives an equal share of Ip and maximizes her utility given the prices and
income. More precisely, each agent chooses her best bundle among the ones she can
exactly afford, given that the final consumptions in the economy will be the bundles
she can exactly afford. Since externalities are anonymous, this is a well defined utility
maximization. Finally, the allocation is feasible.
Definition 3. The pair (pz) ∈RA ×Z is an equal income competitive equilibrium for
u ∈ Un, if for each i ∈N ,
(i) zi ∈ B(p)≡ {(Ip/n−pαα) : α ∈A}
(ii) z ∈ argmax{u(z′) : z′ ∈Z and for each j ∈Nz′j ∈ B(p)}
(iii) z ∈ZM .
Equal income competitive allocations are noncontestable. More interestingly, each
noncontestable allocation is decentralizable in an equal income market.18 That is, for
each such allocation, say z, there is a price vector p such that (pz) is an equal income
competitive equilibrium.19
Given the equivalence of noncontestable allocations and the equal income compet-
itive allocations, it is evident that Theorem 1 and its applications, i.e., Theorems 2, 4,
18The connection between noncontestability and equal income competitive allocations when there are
indivisibilities and no externalities was first noticed by Svensson (1983).
19Take p such that for each α ∈A, pα =maxδ∈A xδ − xα.
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5, and 6 (below), provide conditions under which equal income competitive allocations
exist. Conversely, one can ask whether previous literature providing existence of com-
petitive equilibrium with externalities imply Theorem 1. To the extent of our knowledge,
the only two relevant papers here are Gale (1984) and Dufwenberg et al. (2011). None of
these works implies Theorem 1. Gale (1984) shows existence of competitive equilibria in
an environment with indivisible goods were demand correspondences, the primitive of
his model, may depend on the vector of nominal prices. To guarantee existence of com-
petitive equilibria, Gale assumes that if the price of an object is large enough, the object
is undesirable compared to a free object. If this assumption is satisfied, one cannot guar-
antee, for any budget, that prices are bounded by income in an equal income market.
Dufwenberg et al. (2011) study conditions under which the market behavior of an agent
with other-regarding preferences is indistinguishable from an agent with self-regarding
preferences. Under these conditions standard existence results apply. In contrast, all of
our results apply to economies in which externalities may affect the behavior of agents
in the market. That is, if bundles (xαα) and (xββ) are both affordable to an agent
at prices p and p′, an agent with preferences in U may demand (xαα) at prices p and
(xββ) at prices p′, depending on the effect that the other consumptions have on the
welfare of the agent.
Our results in Section 4 are also relevant for general equilibrium analysis. Exam-
ple 2 in the Appendix implies that there can be situations in which no equal income
competitive equilibrium is efficient. This impossibility is not the end of the road, how-
ever. Section 4 uncovers natural domains of other-regarding preferences in which the
first welfare theorem for equal income competitive allocations holds, i.e., domains in
which each equal income competitive outcome is efficient. These are the first results to
uncover such conditions. The closest result in previous literature is Dufwenberg et al.
(2011, Theorem 5), which provides conditions for a classical inequity-averse economy,
akin to our Theorem 3, under which a competitive equilibrium cannot be Pareto dom-
inated by an income redistribution at market prices. Our results are independent. Un-
like receiving more income in a classical economy, receiving more money than the agent
who previously received a certain object does not guarantee a welfare gain to an agent.
This requires that we develop alternative bounds for an agent’s welfare loss when there
is a reallocation of resources.
5.2 Negative consumption of money
Our results are relevant for the existence of noncontestable allocations when consump-
tions of money can be negative.20 Our welfare analysis already applies to this case.
In some circumstances, agents may have initial individual budgets that allow them to
compensate the other agents so as to get one object or the other. For instance, in the
allocation of tasks and budget shares among senior partners in a consulting firm (Sec-
tion 4.2), a partner can accept to give part of her division’s budget to other divisions that
will perform more demanding tasks. One needs also to consider negative consumptions
20This problem has been of independent interest in the literature, e.g., Alkan et al. (1991).
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of money when the budget is negative, as in the allocations of the rooms and the division
of the rent among roommates.
Theorem 1 implicitly provides conditions for the existence of noncontestable allo-
cations when consumptions of money can be negative. The direct implication of this
theorem is that for a fixed preference profile, if the budget is large enough, then there
are noncontestable allocations at which each agent gets a nonnegative consumption of
money. However, our choice of zero as minimal consumption of money here can be eas-
ily modified. Instead we can require consumptions of money to be at least some lower
bound b and modify the compensation assumption accordingly.
Definition 4. The utility function ui ∈ U satisfies the compensation assumption at
(consumption reference) b if for each z ∈ ZM at which each agent’s consumption of
money is at least b and xi = b, agent i weakly prefers to swap her consumption with
some other agent who receives a consumption of money greater than b.
For a fixed budget and a fixed preference profile u, if the compensation assumption
is eventually satisfied for b low enough, there are noncontestable allocations for u.21
(We omit the proof of the following result, which is a straightforward modification of
our proof of Theorem 1.)
Theorem 5. Let u ∈ Un. If the utility functions of at least n− 1 agents satisfy the compen-
sation assumption at b, then there is (xμ) ∈ ZM that is noncontestable for u and such
that for each i ∈N , xi ≥ b.
The same conditions that guarantee existence of noncontestable allocations when
the budget is large enough in Theorems 2 and 4 guarantee that these allocations exist if
consumptions of money can be negative.
Theorem 6. LetM ∈ R. There are noncontestable allocations in ZM for each u ∈ Un sat-
isfying any of the following statements:
(i) The profile u ∈Fn and the endowment effect is bounded for at least n− 1 agents.
(ii) The profile u ∈ Ln and 1/(n − 1) strictly bounds externality coefficients for at least
n− 1 agents.
5.3 Different numbers of agents and objects
One can easily extend Theorem 1 to an environment were the numbers of agents and
objects may differ. Our welfare analysis is not easily extended when there are more ob-
jects than agents, however. If there are no consumption externalities and |A| > n, one
21Another variant of Theorem 1 can be easily obtained by considering different minimal consumptions
of money for each object, as in the allocation of tasks and salary with task-dependent minimal salary
constraints.
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can prove the existence of noncontestable efficient allocations by introducing |A| − n
agents who only care about money. If z is a noncontestable allocation for the extended
economy, the restriction of z to N is efficient (Alkan et al. 1991). Moreover, one can guar-
antee that for an arbitrary budget M , there will be an extended economy for which the
aggregate consumption of the agents in N is M (Velez 2015). A modified version of Ex-
ample 1 shows that this approach fails in our environment with externalities. Consider
the economy with objects {αβγ} and agents {12} as in the example. Note that their
preferences are anonymous (here we interpret agent 1’s preference as being u1(z) = x1
if no other agent receives γ and u1(z)= x1 − 2 if another agent receives γ). However, the
economy in which we introduce a fictitious agent is our example for which there are no
noncontestable allocations.
It is an open question to obtain conditions under which there are noncontestable
and efficient allocations when there are more objects than agents.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let u ∈ Un be such that the utilities of agents 1     n− 1 satisfy
the compensation assumption. We assume without loss of generality that M = 1. We will
construct a sequence of allocations that converges and its limit is a noncontestable allo-
cation. A nonnegative distribution of money is a vector x≡ (xα)α∈A such that x≥ 0 and∑
α∈A xα = 1. Note that a distribution of money is a vector indexed by objects. Moreover,
the space of distributions of money is isomorphic to the standard simplex n−1 (one can
think of the set of objects as being {α1    αn} and x ∈ n−1 being the distribution of
money in which for each i = 1     n, xαi = xi). Thus, for simplicity we will refer to the
simplex of distributions of money n−1. We will say that allocation z ≡ (yμ) has distri-
bution of money x≡ (xα)α∈A whenever for each i ∈N , her consumption of money at z,
i.e., yi, is equal to xμi . Observe that all the allocations with a given distribution of money
x and at which agent i receives object α are obtained by permuting the consumptions
of money among N \ {i}. Thus, since we assume anonymity of externalities, the set of
allocations with distribution x at which agent i receives a given object is an indifference
class for agent i.
To construct the elements of our sequence of allocations, we will make use of the
so-called barycentric triangulations of n−1 (see Vick 1994, for details). A triangulation
of n−1 is a collection of simplices with the same dimension as n−1 that cover n−1,
with the property that if two simplices intersect, it has to be on a common face (a face
of a simplex is the convex hull of a subset of its extremes, the simplex itself being the
largest face; a facet is a face generated by n− 1 vertices). The first barycentric triangu-
lation of n−1, which we denote by T1, is defined inductively over n as follows. When
n = 1, i.e., the simplex is a single point, T is the trivial covering {n−1}. Now, suppose
that the barycentric triangulations of k have been defined for k = 1     n − 2. Then
the barycentric triangulation of n−1 is the collection of sets conv.hull(b), where 
runs over all simplices in the first barycentric triangulations of the facets of n−1 and
b is the barycenter of n−1. Figure 1(a) shows the first barycentric triangulation when
n = 3. For a triangulation T , let V (T) be the set of all the vertices of simplices in T .
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Figure 1. (a) The first barycentric triangulation of 2. (b) The second barycentric triangulation
of 2. (c) The agent-labeling of the vertices of the second barycentric triangulation of 2. The
barycenters of the faces generated by one vertex of 2 are labeled 1; the barycenters of the faces
generated by two vertices of 2 are labeled 2; the barycenters of the faces generated by three
vertices of 2 are labeled 3.
Notice that the vertices of T1 are the barycenters of all the faces of n−1. Thus, one
can partition these vertices in those that are the barycenters of the faces generated
by one vertex of n−1, the barycenters of the faces generated by two vertices of n−1,
and so on.
The subsequent barycentric triangulations of n−1 are obtained recursively as fol-
lows. Suppose that T1    Tk have been defined. Then Tk+1 is the collection of all the
covering subsimplices of the first barycentric triangulation of all simplices in Tk (this is,
Tk contains all first barycentric triangulations of the triangles in Tk−1). Figure 1(b) shows
the second barycentric triangulation, i.e., T2, when n = 3. If we denote T0 ≡ {n−1}, for
each k> 1, V (Tk) is the set of all barycenters of the faces of all subsimplices in Tk−1.
An agent-labeling of a triangulation T of n−1 is a function that assigns an agent to
each vertex of T , i.e., L : V (T) → {1     n}. We define an agent-labeling Lk for the kth
barycentric triangulation of n−1 as follows: assign to agent 1 the vertices that are the
barycenters of the faces generated by one vertex of some  ∈ Tk−1; assign to agent 2 the
vertices that are the barycenters of the faces generated by two vertices of some  ∈ Tk−1;
and so on. Since any two subsimplices in Tk−1 can intersect only in a common face and
representation inside a simplex is unique, Lk is well defined. Notice that agent n gets
assigned only interior vertices. Moreover, each subsimplex in Tk is fully labeled, i.e.,
each of its extremes is assigned to a different agent.
We construct the kth element of our sequence of allocations. Recall that for a fixed
x ∈ n−1, the allocations with distribution of money x at which an agent receives a given
object are an indifference class for the agent. For x ∈ V (Tk) ask agent Lk(x), “What
are your preferred indifference classes from those associated with the objects when the
distribution of money is x?” The answers to this question can be recorded as the ob-
jects that are received by the agent in the maximal indifference classes. We define an
object-labeling, i.e., a function Ok : V (Tk) → A, that selects for each x ∈ V (Tk), one of
the answers of agent Lk(x), breaking ties in favor of objects with positive amount of
money at x. Since the utility of agents 1     n− 1 satisfy the compensation assumption,
and agent n only Lk-labels interior points of n−1, we are able to select as an answer an
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object, say α, that receives a positive amount of money at x, i.e., xα > 0. Thus, the object-
labeling Ok is a Sperner’s labeling, i.e., the Ok-label of each vertex of n−1 is different and
for each x ∈ V (Tk), Ok(x) is one of the labels of the vertices of n−1 that generate x. By a
well known result in combinatorics (Sperner’s lemma), for each Sperner’s labeling of Tk,
there is an odd number of fully labeled simplices in Tk (see Border 1999, McLennan and
Tourky 2008, Su 1999, for the statement and elemental proofs of Sperner’s lemma). Thus,
there is at least a subsimplex in Tk that is fully Ok-labeled. We define the kth element
of the sequence of allocations as follows. Take  ∈ Tk that is fully Ok-labeled and let
x ∈ . From the bundles {(xαα)}α∈A, assign to agent i ∈N the bundle that contains her
answer to the question for the vertex of  whose Lk-label is i. Since each agent was as-
signed one of the extremes of  and since  is fully Ok-labeled, this defines a feasible
allocation, zk.
Since there is a finite number of objects, we can select a subsequence of {zk}k∈N in
which each agent receives the same object.22 Since n−1 is a compact set, we can select
a subsequence whose distributions converge to a limit x∗. Thus, this subsequence of
allocations converges to an allocation z∗ with distribution of money x∗ and in which
each agent receives the object she receives in each element of the sequence. Since
the mesh sizes of the barycentric triangulations vanish as k → ∞ (Vick 1994), for each
agent and each neighborhood of the limit allocation, there is an allocation at which the
agent receives the object in the limit allocation and at which the agent would not pre-
fer to swap her consumption with any other agent.23 By continuity of preferences, no
agent prefers to swap her consumption with any other agent and the limit allocation is
noncontestable. 
Example 2 (u ∈ Un satisfying the compensation assumption for each agent, such that
the set of efficient allocations for u is nonempty, but no noncontestable allocation for
u is efficient for u). We assume that the budget is zero and drop the nonnegativity re-
quirement in consumptions of money; u can be easily shifted to accommodate nonneg-
ative consumptions. We have A ≡ {αβγ} and N ≡ {123}. For each i ∈ N and each
z ≡ (xμ) ∈ZM ,
ui(z)≡
⎧⎨
⎩
xi + f (xβ) if μi = α
f(xα)+ xi if μi = β
xi if μi = γ,
where f (a)≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if a ∈ ]−∞−2]
a+ 2 if a ∈ ]−2−1]
−a if a ∈ ]−10]
0 if a ∈ ]0+∞[.
22One can construct this sequence by refining {zk}k∈N agent by agent. More precisely, since there is a
finite number of objects, there has to be an object that agent 1 receives in infinitely many elements of the
sequence. Thus, one can pass to a subsequence in which agent 1 receives the same object. From here one
can refine it further so agent 2 receives the same object, and so on.
23Let r > 0 and consider the open ball in n−1 centered at x∗ with radius 12 r. For k large enough, x
k, i.e.,
the distribution of money in zk, is 12 r-close to x
∗ because as k → ∞, xk → x∗. Now, for k large enough,
the mesh size of Tk, i.e., the maximum diameter of a subsimplex, is less than
1
2 r. Let k be large enough
so these two conditions are satisfied and let k be the subsimplex that defines zk. Consider an agent, say
i ∈ N . This agent labels one of the vertices of k in labeling Lk. Let vik be this vertex. Suppose that the
object-labeling of this vertex is α. That means that agent i receives object α at both zk and z. Moreover,
among all allocations with distribution of money vik, agent i’s preferred allocations are those at which she
receives α. Since the diameter of k is at most
1
2 r, then v
ik is r close to x∗.
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One can easily see that ui satisfies the compensation assumption for M ≥ 0. Let z ≡
(xμ) ∈ ZM be the allocation z1 ≡ (−4α), z2 ≡ (−4β), and z3 ≡ (8γ). We claim that
z is efficient for u. Let z′ = (x′μ′) ∈ ZM be such that z′ R z. Then x′3 ≥ 8. Feasibility
implies that another agent gets at most −4. Suppose that x′2 ≤ −4. We claim that x′2 = −4.
Clearly if μ2 = γ, x2 = −4. Suppose that μ2 = α. The only way that agent 2 can get a
utility boost from the consumption of the agent who gets β is that xβ ∈ [−20]. But if
xβ ∈ [−20], x2 ≤ −6 and u2(z′) < −4. Thus, x2 = −4. The problem is symmetric when
μ2 = β. The same argument shows that x1 = −4. Then x′ = x. Thus, z R z′. Now, at
each noncontestable allocation for u, consumptions of money have to be zero. If there
is a consumption that is positive, the consumption of the agent who receives γ has to
be positive. The utility of the agent who receives the minimal consumption of money
is at most zero. Thus, that agent will prefer to swap her consumption with the agent
who receives γ. If consumptions of money are all zero, there is a Pareto improvement by
taking ε ∈ (01) from each agent who receives α and β, and giving 2ε to the agent who
receives γ. ♦
Example 3 (u ∈ Fn and z ≡ (xμ) ∈ ZM that is noncontestable for u such that u satis-
fies Assumption F1, u violates Assumption F2 with the minimal slack possible, u also
violates Assumptions F3 and F4, the set of efficient allocations for u is nonempty, and
z is not efficient for u). Our example has n ≥ 3 agents and the budget is n− 1. For sim-
plicity we label objects A≡ {12     n}. Let z be the allocation at which agent i receives
object i, agents 1     n− 1 receive $1 each, and agent n receives $0. We construct pref-
erences such that the money derivative of viβ(·α) is bounded below by 1 and above
by K, where K ∈ (12). We only make requirements for each i on the functions vii(· j)
with j ∈ A, i.e., the value function for agent i when she receives object i. One can de-
fine vij(· ·) for j = i such that the allocation is noncontestable for u. This requires that
we violate Assumption F3.24 For each agent i = 1     n − 1, ci ≡ 0 and ai ≡ (n − 1)/
((n− 2)(K − 1)). Thus, Assumption F2 will be violated with the minimal slack for these
agents. For agent n, cn = an ≡ 0. We specify preferences for agent 1 such that if agent
1 gives up 1/n in consumption of money, each agent from {2     n− 1} does the same,
and agent n receives the (n−1)/n collected from agents 1     n−1, agent 1 is not worse
off when there is no reshuffling of objects. By symmetry, one can specify preferences for
agents 2     n− 1 such that each of them is not worse off with the change. Since money
is desirable for agent n, she is better off. Thus, our allocation is not efficient for u. Our
preference for agent 1 is such that for each j = 1, v11(11) = v11(1 − (1 − 1/K)/n j) ≡ 0,
v11(1 − 1/n1) = v11(1 − 1/n j) ≡ −1/n, and v11(1 j) ≡ K(1 − 1/K)/n. One can complete
the definition of this functions such that the derivative of v11(·1) is 1 and the deriva-
tive of each v11(· j) with j = 1 is K (since our example holds for arbitrary K > 1, one can
say that u violates Assumption F4 for an arbitrarily small margin).25 Now, agent 1 is not
24As part of the proof of Theorem 3 we prove that if Assumption F3 is satisfied, z is noncontestable for u
only if for each i and j, vii(zi)≥ vii(zj).
25The only restrictions that our assumptions impose are [v11(11) − v11(1 − 1/n1)]/[1/n] = 1 for each
j = i, [v11(1 j) − v11(1 − (1 − 1/K)/n j)]/[(1 − 1/K)/n] = K, and [v11(1 − (1 − 1/K)/n j) − v11(1 − 1/n j)]/
[1− (1− 1/K)/n− (1− 1/n)] =K.
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worse off with the redistribution of money whenever
v11(1− 1/n1)≥ v11(11)−
a1
n− 1
( ∑
j=2n−1
v11(1 j)− v11(11)
)

This inequality holds with equality when a1 ≡ (n− 1)/((n− 2)(K − 1)).
Finally, note that since consumption externalities are negative for each u ∈ F , there
is a level of utility u that cannot be surpassed by each agent simultaneously at an alloca-
tion in z ∈ZM . By continuity, the set argmaxz∈ZM mini∈N ui(z) is nonempty; each alloca-
tion that, for some order, lexicographically maximizes the utility levels of the agents in
this set is efficient for u. ♦
Proof of Theorem 2. Let K > 0 and ui ∈ F be such that for each pair α and β, and
each x ∈ R, |viα(xα) − viβ(xα)| ≤ K. We will prove a general result that will also help
us prove Theorem 6. Let b ∈ R be such that M > nb and suppose that for each pair
{αβ} ⊆ A, viβ(M/nβ) − viα(bα) > K. Let z ≡ (xμ) ∈ ZM , and suppose that xi = b
and for each j = i, xj ≥ b. Since ∑j∈N xj = M , there is j ∈ N such that xj ≥ M/n > b.
Since value functions are increasing in money, then for each pair {αβ} ⊆A, viβ(xββ)−
viα(bα) > K. Let zˆ be the allocation obtained by swapping the consumption bundles
of agents i and j at z. To simplify notation we denote β = μj and α = μi. Let B ≡
{γ ∈A : viβ(xββ) > viβ(xγγ)} and C ≡ {γ ∈A : viα(xαα) > viα(xγγ)}. We obtain condi-
tions guaranteeing ui(zˆ) > ui(z), i.e.,
viβ(xββ)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B
viβ(xββ)− viβ(xγγ)−
ai
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\B
viβ(xγγ)− viβ(xββ)
> viα(bα)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈C
viα(bα)− viα(xγγ)−
ai
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\C
viα(xγγ)− viα(bα)
Let γ ∈ A \ B. Thus, viβ(xγγ) − viβ(xββ) ≥ 0. Moreover, viα(xγγ) − viα(bα) ≥
viβ(xγγ) − viβ(xββ), for otherwise viβ(xββ) − viα(bα) < viβ(xγγ) − viα(xγγ) ≤ K.
Thus, γ ∈A \C. Thus, A \B ⊆A \C and ui(zˆ) > ui(z) whenever
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B∩C
viβ(xββ)− viβ(xγγ)− viα(bα)+ viα(xγγ)
− ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B\C
viβ(xββ)− viβ(xγγ)
− ai
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\B
viβ(xγγ)− viβ(xββ)− viα(xγγ)+ viα(bα) > 0
Since for each γ ∈ A, viβ(xββ)− viα(bα) > K ≥ viβ(xγγ)− viα(xγγ), this inequality is
satisfied whenever
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B∩C
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα)− viβ(xγγ)+ viα(xγγ)
− ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B\C
viβ(xββ)− viβ(xγγ) > 0
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For each γ ∈A \C, viα(bα)−K ≤ viα(xγγ)−K ≤ viβ(xγγ). Thus, the inequality above
holds whenever
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B∩C
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα)− viβ(xγγ)+ viα(xγγ)
− ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B\C
viβ(xββ)− viβ(bα)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B\C
K > 0
Since |B| ≤ n− 1, this inequality holds whenever
(1− ci)(viβ(xββ)− viα(bα))+
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B∩C
viβ(xγγ)− viα(xγγ)−
ci
n− 1
∑
γ∈B\C
K > 0
Since for each γ ∈ A, viβ(xγγ) − viα(xγγ) ≥ −K, this inequality holds whenever
viβ(xββ)− viα(bα) > ciK/(1− ci).
For a fixed b, let M∗ be such that viβ((1/n)M∗β) − viα(bα) > K/(1 − ci). Thus, for
each M ≥M∗, ui satisfies the compensation assumption at b. The theorem then follows
from Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let u ∈ Fn. Let z ≡ (xμ) ∈ ZM be a noncontestable allocation
for u. We prove that z is efficient for u for each set of assumptions in the theorem. We
claim that if z′ ≡ (x′μ′) ∈ ZM is such that for each i ∈ N , ui(z′) ≥ ui(z), it must be the
case that for each α ∈ A, x′α ≥ xα. This implies that z′ is obtained from z by reshuffling
consumption bundles, and thus for each i ∈ N , ui(z) ≥ ui(z′). Suppose by means of
contradiction that there is α ∈ A such that x′α < xα. Suppose without loss of generality
that α ∈ argmaxγ∈A xγ − x′γ . Let j ∈N be such that μ′j = α.
Suppose first that uj satisfies Assamptions F1 and F4. Since z is noncontestable for u,
then uj(z)≥ uj(zˆ), where zˆ is obtained from z by swapping the consumption bundles of
agent j and the agent who receives α at z. We prove that uj(zˆ) > uj(z′), which implies
uj(zˆ) > uj(z), a contradiction. In what follows, we will only analyze statements of prefer-
ence for agent j when receiving object α. To simplify notation, we drop the superindices
and subindices associated with this agent and this object in vjα(· ·), mj , and mj . Let
u ≡ uj(zˆ)− uj(z′) and for each γ ∈ A, let v(γ) ≡ v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ). For each y ∈ RA
and each γ ∈A, let
(yγ)≡ −ajmax{v(yγγ)− v(yαα)0} − cjmax{v(yαα)− v(yγγ)0}
Then
u= v(α)+ 1
n− 1
∑
γ∈A
(xγ)−(x′γ)
For each γ ∈ A, let γ ≡ (xγ) − (x′γ). Let A1 ≡ {γ ∈ A : v(xγγ) ≤ v(xαα)} and
γ ∈ A1. Note that A1 = ∅ for α ∈ A1. We claim that γ ≥ −cj(v(α)− v(γ)). There are
two cases.
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) Fairness and externalities 403
Case 1: v(x′γγ) ≤ v(x′αα). Then γ = −cj(v(xαα) − v(xγγ)) + cj(v(x′αα) −
v(x′γγ)).
Case 2: v(x′γγ) > v(x′αα). Then γ = −cj(v(xαα) − v(xγγ)) + aj(v(x′γγ) −
v(x′αα)) ≥ −cj(v(xαα) − v(xγγ)). Now v(xαα) − v(xγγ) = v(xαα) − v(x′αα) +
v(x′αα) − v(xγγ). By the case hypothesis, v(x′γγ) > v(x′αα). Thus, v(xαα) −
v(xγγ) < v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ). Thus, γ >−cj(v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+
v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ)).
We claim that for each γ ∈ A \A1, γ ≥ 0. Let γ ∈ A \A1. Then v(xγγ) > v(xαα).
There are two cases.
Case 1: x′γ ≥ xγ . Then v(x′γγ) ≥ v(xγγ). Since γ ∈ A \ A1, v(xγγ) > v(xαα).
Thus, v(x′γγ) > v(x′αα). Thus, γ = −aj(v(xγγ)−v(xαα))+aj(v(x′γγ)−v(x′αα))=
aj([v(xαα)− v(x′αα)] + [v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ)])≥ 0.
Case 2: x′γ < xγ . By Assamption F4, the derivative of v(·α) is always greater than
or equal to that of v(·γ). Since xα − x′α ≥ xγ − x′γ , v(xγγ) − v(x′γγ) ≤ v(xαα) −
v(x′αα). Thus, v(xγγ) − v(xαα) ≤ v(x′γγ) − v(x′αα). Since γ ∈ A \ A1, then 0 <
v(xγγ) − v(xαα). Thus, v(x′αα) < v(x′γγ). Thus, γ = −aj(v(xγγ) − v(xαα)) +
aj(v(x
′
γγ) − v(x′αα)) = aj([v(xαα) − v(x′αα)] − [v(xγγ) − v(x′γγ)]). Recall that
v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ)≤ v(xαα)− v(x′αα). Thus, γ ≥ 0.
Since for each γ ∈A1, γ ≥ −cj(v(α)−v(γ)) and for each γ ∈A\A1, γ ≥ 0, then
u≥ v(α)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A1
v(α)+ cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A1
v(γ) (1)
Let B ≡ {γ ∈ A1 : xγ ≤ x′γ}. Recall that by Assamption F1, the derivative of v(·γ) is
bounded above by m and below by m. Thus, if γ ∈ B, then x′γ ≥ xγ and v(γ) ≥
m(xγ − x′γ); if γ ∈ A1 \ B, then x′γ < xγ and v(γ) ≥ m(xγ − x′γ). Thus,
∑
γ∈A1 v(γ) ≥
(m−m)∑γ∈B(xγ − x′γ)+m∑γ∈A1(xγ − x′γ).
We claim that for each C ⊆A,∑γ∈C xγ − x′γ ≥ −(1/m)∑γ∈A\C v(α). Since z ∈Z+M ,
then
∑
γ∈A x′γ ≤
∑
γ∈A xγ .26 Thus,
∑
γ∈C xγ − x′γ ≥
∑
γ∈A\C x′γ − xγ ≥
∑
γ∈A\C x′α − xα,
where the last inequality holds because for each γ ∈ A, xα − x′α ≥ xγ − x′γ . By As-
samption F1, v(α) ≥ m(xα − x′α). Thus, x′α − xα ≥ −(1/m)v(α) and
∑
γ∈C xγ − x′γ ≥
−(1/m)∑γ∈A\C v(α).
Thus,
∑
γ∈A1 v(γ) ≥ −((m − m)/m)
∑
γ∈A\B v(α) −
∑
γ∈A\A1 v(α). Combining
this inequality with inequality (1), we have that
u≥ v(α)
(
1− cj
n− 1
(
|A1| + |A \A1| +
(
m−m
m
)
1B =∅|A \B|
))

where 1B =∅ is the indicator function that equal to 1 when B = ∅ and 0 otherwise. Thus,
u≥ v(α)
(
1− cj
n− 1
(
n+
(
m−m
m
)
(n− 1)
))
= v(α)
(
1− cj
(
1
n− 1 +
m
m
))

By Assamption F1, u> 0.
26Observe that our argument applies when there is free disposal of money for a modified bound in which
the set D at the end of our estimation can be taken to be such that |D| = n− 1.
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Now, suppose that uj satisfies Assamption F2 (Assamption F2 implies Assamp-
tion F1). Note that the only place that Assamption F4 was used above was to prove
that for each γ ∈ A \ A1 such that x′γ < xγ , γ ≥ 0. We prove now that for each such γ,
γ ≥ −aj(m/m− 1)v(α). Since γ ∈A \A1, then
γ = −aj(v(xγγ)− v(xαα))+ cjmax{v(x′αα)− v(x′γγ)0}
+ ajmax{v(x′γγ)− v(x′αα)0}
Since xγ > x′γ , v(xγγ) − v(x′γγ) ≤ m(xγ − x′γ) ≤ m(xα − x′α) ≤ (m/m)(v(xαα) −
v(x′αα)). Then
v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ)≤
m
m
v(α) (2)
There are two cases.
Case 1: v(x′γγ) < v(x′αα). Then γ = −aj(v(xγγ) − v(xαα)) + cj(v(x′αα) −
v(x′γγ)). By the case hypothesis, v(x′αα) > v(x′γγ). Thus, γ ≥ −aj(v(xγγ) −
v(xαα)). Now v(xγγ)− v(xαα)= v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ)+ v(x′γγ)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′αα)−
v(xαα). By the case hypothesis, 0> v(x′γγ)− v(x′αα). Thus,
v(xγγ)− v(xαα)≤ v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ)− (v(xαα)− v(x′αα))≤
(
m
m
− 1
)
v(α)
where the last inequality follows from (2).
Case 2: v(x′γγ) ≥ v(x′αα). Then γ = −aj(v(xγγ) − v(xαα)) + aj(v(x′γγ) −
v(x′αα)). Thus, γ = −aj(v(xγγ)− v(x′γγ))+ aj(v(xαα)− v(x′αα)). Our claim then
follows from (2).
Let D≡ {γ ∈A \A1 : x′γ < xγ}. Then
u≥ v(α)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A1
v(α)+ cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A1
v(γ)− aj
n− 1
∑
γ∈D
(
m
m
− 1
)
v(α)
The remainder of the argument when Assumptions F1 and F4 hold is valid. Thus,
u≥ v(α)
(
1− cj
n− 1
(
1
n− 1 +
m
m
)
− aj
n− 1
(
m
m
− 1
)
|D|
)

The cardinality of D is at most n− 2, for otherwise∑γ∈A x′γ <∑γ∈A xγ .27 Thus,
u≥ v(α)
(
1− cj
(
1
n− 1 +
m
m
)
− aj n− 2
n− 1
(
m
m
− 1
))

By Assumption F2, u> 0.
27If we assume free disposal of money, Assumption F2 must be modified to reflect the possibility that
|D| = n− 1.
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Finally, suppose that uj satisfies Assumptions F1 and F3. Since Assumption F3 holds,
we continue dropping the subindex α in vjα(· ·). Since we will only make statements
about the rankings of agent j, we will also continue dropping the subindex and su-
perindex j from the notation.
Let s ≡ (yσ) ∈ Z and let s′ be the allocation obtained from s by swapping the
consumption bundles of agents j and i. We claim that uj(s) ≥ uj(s′) if and only if
v(sj) ≥ v(si). By definition of uj , if v(sj) = v(si), then uj(s) = uj(s′). We prove that if
v(sj) > v(si), then uj(s) > uj(s′), which completes the proof of our claim. Denote σj ≡ δ
and σi ≡ η. Let A1 ≡ {γ ∈ A : v(yγγ) ≥ v(yδδ)} and B1 ≡ {γ ∈ A : v(yγγ) ≥ v(yηη)}.
Then uj(s) > uj(s′) whenever
v(yδδ)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\A1
v(yδδ)− v(yγγ)− aj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A1
v(yγγ)− v(yδδ)
> v(yηη)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\B1
v(yηη)− v(yγγ)− aj
n− 1
∑
γ∈B1
v(yγγ)− v(yηη)
Since v(yδδ) > v(yηη), then A1 ⊆ B1 and A \ B1 ⊆ A \A1. Thus, the inequality above
is satisfied whenever
v(yδδ)− v(yηη)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\B1
v(yδδ)− v(yηη)
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈(A\A1)\(A\B1)
v(yδδ)− v(yγγ) > 0
Since for each γ ∈ (A \ A1) \ (A \ B1) ⊆ B1, v(yηη) ≤ v(yγγ), the inequality above is
satisfied whenever, v(yδδ)−v(yηη)− (cj/(n−1))∑γ∈A\A1 v(yδδ)−v(yηη) > 0. This
inequality holds because δ ∈A1 and cj < 1.
Recall that α ∈ argmaxγ∈A xγ − x′γ and μ′j = α. Let β ≡ μj . We conclude by proving
that uj(z) > uj(z′), a contradiction. By our claim above and since z is noncontestable
for u, we have that for each i ∈ N , v(zj) ≥ v(zi). Let E ≡ A \ {αβ} and C ≡ {γ ∈ A :
v(x′αα)≥ v(x′γγ)}. Thus, uj(z) > uj(z′) whenever
v(xββ)− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E
(v(xββ)− v(xγγ))− cj
n− 1(v(xββ)− v(xαα))
> v(x′αα)−
cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈C
(v(x′αα)− v(x′γγ))−
aj
n− 1
∑
γ∈A\C
(v(x′γγ)− v(x′αα))
Thus, uj(z) > uj(z′) whenever(
1− cj
n− 1
)
(v(xββ)− v(xαα))+ v(xαα)− v(x′αα)
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E∩C
(v(xββ)− v(xγγ))− (v(x′αα)− v(x′γγ))
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E\C
(v(xββ)− v(xγγ)) > 0
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Equivalently,
(
1− cj
n− 1
)
(v(xββ)− v(xαα))+ v(xαα)− v(x′αα)
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E∩C
(v(xββ)− v(xαα)+ v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ))
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E\C
(v(xββ)− v(xαα)+ v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ))
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E\C
(v(x′αα)− v(x′γγ)) > 0
Since z is noncontestable for u, then v(xββ) ≥ v(xαα). Since |E| = n− 1 only if β = α
and cj < 1, we have that the inequality above holds whenever
v(xαα)− v(x′αα)−
cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E∩C
(v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ))
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E\C
(v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ))
− cj
n− 1
∑
γ∈E\C
(v(x′αα)− v(x′γγ)) > 0
Since for each γ /∈ C, v(x′αα) < v(x′γγ), then the inequality above holds whenever,
v(xαα)− v(x′αα)− (cj/(n− 1))
∑
γ∈E(v(xαα)− v(x′αα)+ v(x′γγ)− v(xγγ)) > 0. By
the same argument after (1) we have that this inequality holds whenever
(v(xαα)− v(x′αα))
(
1− cj
n− 1
(
|E| + |A \E| +
(
m−m
m
)
1B′ =∅|A \B′|
))
> 0
where B′ ≡ {γ ∈E : x′γ ≥ xγ}. This inequality holds by Assumption F1. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let u ∈ Ln be such that for each i ∈N and each pair of different
objects α and β, ci(αβ) < 1/(n − 1). Let i ∈ N . Recall that ui has the form, for each
z ≡ (xμ) ∈Z,
u(z)≡ v(μi)+ xi +
∑
j =i
ci(μiμj)xj
To simplify notation we write cβα instead of ci(αβ). Suppose without loss of generality
that there are different objects α and β such that cβα > 0, for otherwise the preferences
exhibit no externalities, and the result is easily verified. Let k ≡ min
α=βcβα>0 1/c
β
α and
≡max{δγ}⊆A |v(δ)− v(γ)|. By our hypothesis, k> n− 1.
We will prove a more general result that will also help us prove Theorem 6. Let M ∈R
and b≤ 0 be such that b <M . Let z ≡ (xμ) ∈ZM be such that xi = b and for each j = i,
xj ≥ b. Let z′ ≡ (x′μ′) be the allocation obtained by swapping agent i’s consumption
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bundle with that of one agent who gets the highest consumption of money at z. We
obtain conditions guaranteeing that ui(z′) ≥ ui(z). Let B ≡ {α ∈ A : xα ≤ 0} and C ≡
{α ∈ A : xα > 0}. Let α ≡ μi and β ≡ μ′i. Since α ∈ B, then B = ∅. Since M > b, then
β ∈ C = ∅. Denote cαα = cββ = 0. Then ui(z′)≥ ui(z) whenever
v(α)− v(β)+ b− xβ +
∑
γ∈B
(cγα − cγβ)xγ +
∑
γ∈C
(cγα − cγβ)xγ ≤ 0
This inequality is satisfied whenever  + b − xβ − (1/k)∑γ∈B xγ + (1/k)∑γ∈C xγ ≤ 0.
Since for each γ ∈ B, xγ ≥ b and for each γ ∈ C, xγ ≤ xβ, the inequality above holds
whenever, + b− xβ − |B|b/k+ |C|xβ/k≤ 0. Reorganizing terms, + (|C| − |B|)b/k≤
(k−|C|)(xβ−b)/k. Now xβ−b≥ (M−nb)/(n−1), for otherwise M = b+∑δ=α xδ < b+
(n− 1)b+M − nb=M . Since k> |C|, then ui(z′)≥ ui(z) whenever, + (|C| − |B|)b/k≤
(k− |C|)(M − nb)/((n− 1)k). Equivalently,
+
(
(n− 1)(k− |B|)+ (k− |C|)
(n− 1)k
)
b≤
(
k− |C|
(n− 1)k
)
M
Since k> |C|, this inequality is satisfied whenever
(n− 1)k
k− (n− 1)+ min0≤|C|≤n−10≤|B|≤n−1|C|+|B|=n
(
(n− 1)(k− |B|)+ (k− |C|)
k− |C|
)
b≤M (3)
For a fixed b≤ 0 the left term of the inequality above defines M∗b such that for each M >
max{bM∗b}, ui satisfies the compensation assumption at b. Thus, the first part of the
theorem follows from Theorem 1.
Finally, we prove that if z ∈ ZM is noncontestable for u, then z is efficient for u. Let
M ∈ R and let z ≡ (xμ) ∈ ZM be a noncontestable allocation for u. We claim that if
z′ ≡ (x′μ′) ∈Z is such that∑i∈N x′i ≤M and for each i ∈N , ui(z′)≥ ui(z), it must be the
case that for each α ∈A, x′α ≥ xα.28 This implies that z′ is obtained from z by reshuffling
consumption bundles, and thus for each i ∈N , ui(z)≥ ui(z′). Suppose by contradiction
that there is α ∈A such that x′α < xα. Let α ∈ argmax{xβ−x′β : β ∈A}. Let ε≡ xα−x′α > 0.
Let i ∈ N be such that μ′i = α. Since z is noncontestable for u, then ui(z) ≥ ui(zˆ), where
zˆ is obtained from z by swapping the consumption bundle of agent i and the agent who
receives α. We claim that ui(zˆ) > ui(z′). Writing cβα for ci(αβ), this is
xα +
∑
β∈A\{α}
cβαxβ > x
′
α +
∑
β∈A\{α}
cβαx
′
β
Let B ≡ {β ∈ A \ {α} : xβ < x′β} and C ≡ {β ∈ A \ {α} : xβ ≥ x′β}. Since∑
β∈C c
β
α (xβ − x′β) ≥ 0, then this inequality is satisfied whenever (xα − x′α) +∑
β∈B c
β
α (xβ − x′β) > 0. Suppose without loss of generality that B = ∅, for otherwise the
result is trivial. Let ϒ ≡∑β∈B cβα (x′β − xβ). We need to prove that ϒ < xα − x′α = ε.
Now ϒ ≤ maxβ∈A\{α} cβα∑β∈B(x′β − xβ) < (1/(n − 1))∑β∈B(x′β − xβ), where the strict
28Our argument also applies when there is free disposal of money.
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inequality follows from B = ∅. Since ∑β∈A x′β ≤ ∑β∈A xβ, then ∑β∈B(x′β − xβ) ≤∑
β∈A\B(xβ − x′β) ≤ |A \ B|ε. Thus, ϒ < (n− 1)ε/(n− 1). Thus, ui(zˆ) > ui(z′) ≥ ui(z) ≥
ui(zˆ). This is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Let M ∈ R and ui ∈ F be such that there is K > 0 such that for
each pair of objects α and β and each x ∈R, |viα(xα)−viβ(xα)| ≤K. For a fixed M , let b∗
be such that M > nb∗ and for each pair {αβ} ⊆A, viβ(M/nβ)− viα(b∗α) > K/(1− ci).
By the same argument as in Theorem 2, ui satisfies the compensation assumption at
each b≤ b∗.
Let u ∈ Ln and suppose that for each i ∈ N and each pair of different objects α and
β, ci(αβ) < 1/(n − 1). Observe that the coefficient that multiplies b in the left term of
inequality (3) is positive. Thus, if we fix M , there is b∗ <min{0M} such that ui satisfies
the compensation assumption at each b≤ b∗.
The theorem then follows from Theorem 5. 
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